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1113 
ARE MODERN BLOGGERS FOLLOWING IN THE 
FOOTSTEPS OF PUBLIUS? (AND OTHER 
MUSINGS ON BLOGGING BY LEGAL 
SCHOLARS . . .) 
GAIL HERIOT* 
ABSTRACT 
Is legal blogging an antidote to the hyper-scholasticism that sometimes 
characterizes the legal academy today? Or is it a self-indulgence for legal 
scholars? It’s hard to know. On the one hand, there is a proud American 
tradition behind the publication of concise but erudite essays aimed at a 
broad audience concerning the important legal issues of the day, starting 
with the Federalist Papers. It’s hard to believe that neglecting that 
tradition in favor of a cloistered academic existence in which legal 
scholars write only for each other could be a good thing. On the other 
hand, even the best legal blogs contain more chaff than wheat. And legal 
bloggers who offer mostly ill-considered opinions on every topic 
imaginable may bring disrepute to the legal academy. On the whole, I am 
inclined to be cautiously optimistic about the potential value of legal 
blogging. But then I enjoy blogging, so perhaps my judgment on these 
matters ought not be deferred to too readily. 
Thomas Jefferson called the collection of essays we now know as the 
Federalist Papers “the best commentary on the principles of government, 
which ever was written.”1 And if the judgment of history counts for 
anything, he may not have been too far off the mark. In colleges and 
universities all over the world, the Federalist Papers2 have been read and 
discussed many times over, sometimes alone and sometimes in 
conjunction with the Anti-Federalist Papers.3 Somebody obviously thinks 
highly of them. 
 
 
 *  Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. Ms. Heriot’s comments on law, 
politics, and culture, along with those of her USD colleagues, Mike Rappaport, Maimon 
Schwarzschild, and Tom Smith, are available at The Right Coast (http://rightcoast.typepad.com/ 
rightcoast/). Thanks go to Paul Caron for making this conference on blogging by legal scholars 
possible. 
 1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov. 18, 1788) (on file with the Library of 
Congress). 
 2. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST (George W. Carey 
& James McClellan eds., Gideon 2001). 
 3. See THE ESSENTIAL FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS (David Wootton ed. 2003). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Part of the Federalist Papers’ longevity is just luck. If the proposed 
Constitution had been rejected, it is unlikely that they would ever have 
been collected into a single volume. And if the Constitution had later 
failed, they would likely have sunk into obscurity. Insofar as they have 
had staying power, it is because the Constitution has had staying power. 
But luck was not the only factor working in the Federalist Papers’ favor. If 
they didn’t contain useful insights about the nature of man and the 
governments men create, they would have been forgotten years ago. The 
Constitution’s success by no means guaranteed their fame.  
When one is looking at a heavy leather-bound edition of the Federalist 
Papers, it’s easy to lose sight of their humble origins. These essays didn’t 
start off life with all that gold tooling. They were written for various 
newspapers in New York and handed out on street corners. No doubt more 
than one “original edition” had beer spilled or mustard smeared on it 
before the sun had set that evening. Most of the rest made it to the garbage 
heap by the end of the week. The authors, moreover, weren’t grey-haired 
philosophers writing for the ages. They were lawyers—thirty-year-old 
Alexander Hamilton, thirty-six-year-old James Madison, and their “elder 
statesman” forty-two-year-old John Jay—with a short-term goal in mind: 
Get the proposed Constitution ratified in New York. Do it by responding 
to the Anti-Federalist arguments that seem to be getting the most traction 
on the street. And be quick about it, because, like it or not, minds are being 
made up every day, and it will be impossible to un-make many of those 
minds once they are made.4 
Like most political tracts, the Federalist Papers occasionally 
mischaracterize the arguments of their opponents or make arguments that, 
upon reflection, few would find particularly convincing. But that is 
forgivable. The authors were working at a furious pace under a great deal 
of pressure. It’s not surprising to find that some of the essays are better 
than others or that even the better essays are less than perfect. 
What is surprising is how, despite these faults, the authors aimed for, 
and for the most part achieved, a level of sophistication that would be 
unimaginable in the mainstream media today. In among the saw mill 
advertisements and shipping news that filled the New York newspapers of 
the day were some remarkably learned and insightful essays that, among 
other things, distilled and applied for a popular audience much of the 
 
 
 4. See id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/9
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contemporary and ancient learning on governmental structure. And they 
may well have turned the tide in favor of ratification.5 
It’s hard for a legal scholar not to get an idea in her head that one day, 
if the stars are properly aligned, she may be able to produce topical little 
essays with the combined virtues of the Federalist Papers (or even the 
Anti-Federalist Papers). By that, of course, I don’t mean that I may be able 
to produce essays that persuade some future nation to adopt a grand 
constitutional charter. That might be setting my sights just a tad too high. 
But it would be nice to have the opportunity to write something short and 
informal. It would also be nice if the topic could be of immediate 
importance and if the commentary could be just a little bit insightful. And 
it would be especially nice if it could be widely read and consequential. To 
put it another way, it would be great to write the perfect legal blog—for in 
some sense, that’s what Messrs. Hamilton, Jay, and Madison were doing. 
On their best days, some of my fellow legal scholars/bloggers have gotten 
reasonably close to the goal. And maybe I will too some day. 
To understand why a legal scholar might wish to blog, one need only 
contrast the style of the Federalist Papers with that of modern legal 
scholarship, which for many years had been developing in precisely the 
opposite direction. Unlike the Federalist authors, modern legal scholars 
most often write long, ponderous law review articles whose connection to 
the legal and political issues of the day is decidedly indirect. Seldom does 
the work have direct or observable consequences. As a result, although the 
job of the legal scholar must surely be one of the most pleasurable 
occupations in the world, a feeling that one’s work has been widely read 
and had consequences outside the ivory tower is not one of the more 
common pleasures it offers. 
How did legal scholars get in that position? Our detachment from the 
issues of the day is largely intentional. As a law student writing for the 
University of Chicago Law Review twenty-something years ago, I was 
repeatedly advised to choose a topic that as few people as possible cared 
about. It was good advice. Attempting to write on a hot topic would risk 
preemption given the lengthy lead time necessary to write and edit a law 
review comment. If I had attempted to critique a pending case or a 
legislative bill, it would likely not be pending by the time the comment 
 
 
 5. The people of the City of New York apparently thought so. On July 23, 1788, Alexander 
Hamilton was honored by a celebratory parade that featured a twenty-seven-foot miniature frigate at 
full sail being pulled down Broadway by ten horses and dubbed the “Federal Ship Hamilton.” It seems 
unlikely they would have done this for a man they thought had simply written a few interesting essays. 
See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 268–69 (2004). 
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was published. A lot can happen to a hot issue to make it stone cold before 
a scholarly treatment of it can reach print. 
Faculty members face similar constraints. In addition to the time spent 
writing their articles, the typical faculty member must factor in the time-
consuming process of finding a law review willing to publish it. And 
although new technologies are changing things somewhat, sticking to 
issues with low public profiles is still the safest strategy when writing 
formal legal scholarship. As a result of these and other built-in restrictions, 
in recent years, the work of most legal scholars has had a very small 
audience—composed mainly of other legal scholars. Indeed, even fellow 
legal scholars aren’t always a dependable audience. My colleague and 
fellow blogger Tom Smith reports that forty percent of law review articles 
are never cited by anyone—not even their own authors.6  
The voice of legal scholarship has not always been quite so lonely. For 
most of the twentieth century, legal scholars typically wrote about the 
kinds of issues that judges and lawyers actually confronted in their 
professional lives. Because legal scholars had both the necessary time to 
take a long, sustained look at the issues and the detachment that comes 
from representing no one but themselves, they could be assured a 
significant, though not always large, audience outside the legal academy. 
Some legal scholars still do this sort of traditional legal scholarship.7 But 
somewhere in the course of the last generation or two, probably for both 
good and ill, the legal academy shifted its focus. Most of the glamorous 
scholarly work is no longer written to be of assistance to a professional 
audience. Instead, it has become increasingly abstract in nature. As a direct 
consequence, most judges and lawyers have lost interest, and the legal 
academy has turned inward on itself.  
Not everyone has been pleased with this shift. In a 1992 law review 
article that was widely read by legal scholars, Judge Harry Edwards wrote: 
I fear that our law schools and law firms are moving in opposite 
directions. The schools should be training ethical practitioners and 
producing scholarship that judges, legislators, and practitioners can 
use. . . . But many law schools—especially the so-called “elite” 
 
 
 6. Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law 22 (Spring 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=642863. 
 7. Tax is an example of an area where traditional scholarship is still strong. Academics in the 
tax area tend to write articles that are useful to tax lawyers; tax lawyers in turn sometimes contribute to 
the academic tax literature. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/9
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ones—have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract 
theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy.8  
Others, most notably Judge Richard Posner, expressed “deep 
disagreements” with Edwards’s position.9 Posner pointed out that some of 
the new scholarship has indeed been consequential. As an example he 
pointed to the effect the law and economics literature has had on antitrust 
law. Sadly, however, after another fifteen years, Posner’s antitrust 
example, although an excellent one, remains the best example of how the 
new legal scholarship can have direct consequences on the law. Few 
would deny Edwards’s most basic observation—that legal scholarship has 
become more abstract and hence less accessible to the average practicing 
lawyer, judge, or legislator—or that it is difficult given those 
circumstances for the new scholarship to have direct consequences on the 
law. To be sure, it may have profound indirect consequences. But indirect 
consequences are both unpredictable and difficult to measure. As a result, 
they can be less satisfying to the author—at least if abstract legal 
scholarship is all the author ever writes. 
Perhaps a more interesting question is why the shift occurred. Some of 
my colleagues in the legal academy have suggested that as more and more 
talented people have been attracted to the legal academy, they have found 
it more and more dissatisfying to address “little questions” that confront 
lawyers and judges, and more desirable to think about the “big questions” 
that we sometimes label legal theory. No doubt there are many reasons for 
the change, but I am more inclined to credit a different one: legal scholars 
found themselves edged out of the market by competition. Judges, assisted 
by an army of recently graduated law clerks, found that they could 
produce large numbers of essays that exhaustively analyze the issues that 
come before judges and lawyers using the traditional tools of the legal 
profession.10 These essays had an advantage over legal scholars’ work 
because they were part of authoritative court decisions. Lawyers felt 
obliged to read them. If legal scholars were to maintain their prestige they 
 
 
 8. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992). 
 9. Richard A. Posner, The De-Professionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. 
L. REV. 1921 (1993). 
 10. Both the proportion of decisions that produced published opinions and the length of those 
opinions dramatically increased over the course of most of the twentieth century. As these opinions 
could be accessed through increasingly sophisticated research tools starting with Shepard’s citation 
service and West’s Digests and continuing through Lexis, Westlaw or the Internet, judges and lawyers 
had less reason to rely on the work of legal scholars, which did not carry with it the authority of a court 
decision.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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would have to find a new angle, much as painters had to find a new, more 
abstract angle after the invention of photography. 
Legal scholars did, of course, find a new angle—several new angles. 
They reinvented themselves—a privilege not everyone in every job 
category has. In addition to the “traditional legal scholar” model, other 
models of the ideal legal scholar were born—what I might call the “legal 
activist,” the “legal scientist,” and the “legal philosopher.” And while few 
flesh and blood legal scholars precisely personify one and only one of 
these ideals, most legal scholars can be fairly described as predominantly 
one or a mix of two. These new ideals started legal scholarship down the 
road toward increasingly abstract scholarship for a small academic 
audience. That in turn ultimately led to a reaction under which some 
contemporary legal scholars have turned to blogging as a way of 
reconnecting with the world outside the academy. 
The “legal activist” was the first new model to emerge in the post-
traditional era. By that term, I mean the model of the law professor who 
devotes his talents to achieving justice in the halls of power—the “action 
figure” law professor. The true legal activist litigates cases on behalf of 
causes he deems worthy. Alternatively, he may put his primary energies 
into monitoring and lobbying legislatures and administrative agencies on 
behalf of such causes. Legal activists are in effect crusaders for justice—
an image that went a long way toward injecting some life into the 
otherwise tired image of the law professor—at least when the model first 
emerged. 
One of the advantages of the activist model is that it exposes law 
students to faculty members who are actually engaged in legal practice—
albeit a kind of legal practice that differs enormously from the typical 
practice in ways that are subtle and not-so-subtle.11 When law students can 
assist in such litigation (as they do in a clinical setting) the potential for 
learning is obvious—provided the work to be done is neither too difficult 
nor too easy for beginning lawyers. The primary risk in this setting is that 
students will learn to mistake uninformed passion for legal judgment and 
skill. This is a danger that can be minimized by talented and thoughtful 
legal activists, although, unfortunately, not all legal activists have done so.  
Whatever one thinks of the legal activist model, however, there has 
never been much chance that it would take over the legal academy. Law 
 
 
 11. In an earlier day, some law professors were also practicing lawyers and not legal scholars in 
that they did not write scholarly works of any kind. Today, some law students are exposed to lawyers 
with typical legal practices mainly through adjunct faculty members, who unfortunately and probably 
unavoidably tend not to be well integrated into the life of the law school. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/9
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schools simply can’t finance it. The number of students who can 
participate in litigation clinics is quite limited; the level of supervision 
required is quite extensive. If a significant part of the law school 
curriculum were taught through clinics, it would likely bankrupt all but the 
wealthiest law schools. The alternative—having legal activists teach the 
curriculum in a classroom setting—is no more appealing. Classroom 
teaching is usually inconsistent with the demands of legal activism; 
litigation in particular is more easily conducted by full-time lawyers 
working in the hierarchical structure of the law firm. Even when it can be 
made to work, it’s not clear why law schools should be interested in 
heavily subsidizing legal activities without a teaching component.  
As a result, most law schools have only a limited number of legal 
activists. Moreover, these legal activists are marginal players in the 
production of legal scholarship. They write briefs and occasionally testify 
before legislatures, boards, and administrative agencies, but they don’t 
write law review articles, treatises, or books.12 Legal scholarship for the 
most part has to be left to others. 
The new legal scholars are therefore primarily the “legal scientist” and 
the “legal philosopher.” Together those two have dominated the elite law 
reviews of the last generation. Along with the traditional legal scholar, 
they also teach the bulk of the law school curriculum. Unlike either the 
traditional legal scholar or the legal activist, little of what they write 
employs the traditional lawyer’s tools of case analysis and statutory 
analysis.13 Seldom does a close reading of a case or statute appear in their 
formal legal scholarship. Instead, the legal scientist studies law and legal 
institutions using the methods of the behavioral sciences—originally 
mostly economics, but more recently political science, psychology, and 
sociology. The legal philosopher uses the traditional tools of the 
philosopher. For example, a traditional legal scholar might ask the 
question, “Under what circumstances will a court, sitting in equity, impose 
a constructive trust?” But a legal scientist might ask, “Is the imposition of 
 
 
 12. As a result, the slow speed at which legal scholarship is produced and published is not a 
problem for legal activists. Most of the time, legal activists speak directly to the courts and other legal 
institutions, not to other legal scholars, the legal professions, or the general public. When they do 
occasionally publish in law reviews, it is often because they have already written a brief that was read 
only by the judge and the attorneys working on the litigation, and they want to convert it to a law 
review article to ensure that it is preserved somewhere. 
 13. The one glamourous area of the law that is in the traditional legal scholarship mode is 
constitutional law, especially when it is done from an originalist perspective rather than the once-
fashionable straight public policy perspective. But unlike many fields, constitutional law has few 
specialists outside the legal academy. As a result, although many lawyers are interested in the subject, 
few read legal scholarship in the area.  
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a constructive trust consistent with the economic goal of efficiency?” And 
a question for the legal philosopher might be, “Is the economist’s goal of 
efficiency an appropriate one?”  
Both approaches are very different from the practice of law. Scientists 
and philosophers are “real” academics whose methods are essentially 
similar to the methods of economists, political scientists, psychologists, 
sociologists, and philosophers in an arts and sciences school. They happen 
to take law and legal institutions as the object of their study (although 
particular legal scientists and legal philosophers may be trained as lawyers 
as well). As academics, they are perfectionists. Scientists seek, through the 
application of the scientific method, to slowly but steadily build a body of 
reliable truth. As time goes by, with luck, the legal scientists hope that 
progress will be made as more hypotheses are shown to be sufficiently 
reliable to apply the term “science” to them. But scientists never claim that 
everything is within the immediate reach of science, and when they are 
tempted to, philosophers quickly inform them of their error. They must 
build a scientific foundation first. Just as scientists can’t know everything 
about what lies at the ocean depths or the far reaches of the galaxy until 
they in some sense “get there” (and even then there will be ambiguities 
and disagreements), legal scientists can’t provide the answers to all 
questions of law and public policy—even the purely factual ones. Further 
progress must be made—and many questions will likely remain 
unanswered forever. In the final analysis, there is no final analysis. 
Lawyers often have no such luxury. Their work is not done in 
cloistered ivory towers. It is done in the hustle and bustle of downtowns, 
small towns, and neighborhoods. As judges and litigators, they must 
resolve disputes in a timely manner. As legislators and lobbyists, they 
must try to provide a statutory and regulatory framework that will promote 
the general welfare in the here and now. In performing all these tasks, they 
will forever be acting on less than full information. It’s up to them to 
somehow fill the gaps. Indeed, gap filling is a significant part of their 
stock in trade. 
If at the end of a criminal trial, the jurors can’t in good faith claim to be 
“certain” of the defendant’s guilt, the gap may be filled with a rule 
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If at the end of oral arguments 
on a civil appeal, the court is still not certain whether justice is better 
served by adopting one policy or the other, the gap may be filled with the 
doctrine of stare decisis, which directs the court to follow past practices 
and traditions. Lawyers have a style of analysis that makes tough 
questions manageable and promotes at least a modicum of closure. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/9
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That doesn’t mean that scientists and philosophers should not be 
teaching law students. Of course they should. A good lawyer can and 
should draw on multiple sources, and an increasingly scientific world is 
likely to increasingly draw upon science in the formulation of law and 
public policy. As academic institutions, law schools should be at the 
forefront of these efforts. At the same time, it is important to recall that the 
skills employed by scientists and philosophers are not completely 
congruent with the set of skills that lawyers must master and display. 
Lawyers must be able to argue persuasively to a general audience (as well 
as a broad professional audience). Lawyers must know when to 
improvise—to use available evidence and learning even when it is 
incomplete—and when not to. And they must have the quality that Dean 
Anthony Kronman once called “practical wisdom”—the intuitive 
understanding of human conduct that comes from having seen and 
pondered an awful lot of it.14 Their teachers, or at least some of them, 
should hone and display these skills too.  
How can these lawyerly skills be displayed (and honed) by legal 
scholars? For reasons I’ve already discussed, it’s not clear that it would be 
wise to encourage large numbers of legal scholars to be part-time 
litigators. Perhaps instead the gap can be filled (however imperfectly) by 
providing public commentary on legal and policy issues. 
That leads me to the other possible model (or partial model) for the law 
professor—the “public intellectual.” By that, I mean the public 
commentator on current issues and events who attempts to bring academic 
thinking to bear on those issues and events. In some ways this is an ideal 
role for legal scholars. A large portion of the issues that command the 
public’s attention involve law and legal institutions, so legal scholars have 
expertise. As lawyers, many legal scholars are adept at speaking or writing 
about contemporary issues of law and public policy with an eye toward 
clarity and persuasion.15 But unlike practicing lawyers, they have the time 
to devote to public commentary—at least if their academic institutions 
agree that public commentary is a useful way for them to spend their time. 
 
 
 14. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
53–108 (1995). See Gail Heriot, Songs of Experience, 81 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1995) (reviewing The Lost 
Lawyer). 
 15. Contrary to popular belief, lawyers are not the world’s worst writers. The job of a litigator is 
to persuade judge and jury of the rightness of his client’s position. That requires considerable skill with 
language. While lawyers who represent clients in transactions are a different literary breed, whose goal 
is not to persuade but to remove all ambiguity from the mind of the careful reader, they too must write 
clearly and skillfully. But they needn’t be fun to read (and ordinarily are not). 
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And unlike practicing lawyers, many can also bring to bear on the issues 
their expertise as legal scientists and legal philosophers. 
Until recently, the “public intellectual” simply was not a viable role for 
legal scholars. In large part this was because the existing media did not fit 
in well with the ideal. Large numbers of law professors appeared on 
television news from time to time when a legal news story appeared. But 
only the least self-aware imagined that their thirty-second sound bites had 
any implications beyond the filling of air time. It’s simply not possible to 
say something worthwhile in that amount of time.  
Radio is only slightly better. With that medium, more time can be 
devoted to discussions of law and public policy. But no one imagines that 
Messrs. Hamilton, Jay, and Madison would be invited onto a radio show 
today in their role as public intellectuals to hold forth on the proposed 
Constitution in anything like the length, breadth, and depth that they did in 
the New York newspapers. Radio is a medium with a short attention span. 
If you’re going to make a point, you need to make it between the time 
your listener climbs into her car in the morning and arrives at Starbucks 
two and one-half minutes later. You may get a second opportunity during 
the trip between Starbucks and the Home Depot or you may not, because 
if you bore her for even a single second, she’ll punch the button for 
another station. At that point, you’re radio history. 
Newspapers that publish op-eds written by law professors are another 
rung up. But the odds that an American newspaper would publish 
something that takes advantage of a law professor’s expertise are low, and 
the odds it would publish something with the level of sophistication of the 
Federalist Papers are very low indeed. Evidently, a lot has changed in 219 
years. The opportunities legal scholars have to write interesting pieces for 
newspapers and general circulation magazines are few—too few for a 
significant number of legal scholars to act as public intellectuals through 
that medium. 
But the blogosphere is different. When it came into being, legal 
scholars quickly became some of the most successful practitioners of the 
gentle art of blogging. Hundreds of them are bloggers.16 Of the top one 
hundred blogs anywhere in the world, as listed by Technorati, two are 
wholly or partly authored by American law professors.17 We are a blog-
happy group.18  
 
 
 16. See, e.g., Cynthia Cotts, The Law Professor as Public Intellectual, The American Lawyer on 
the Web, http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleFriendlyTAL.jsp?id=1148634332208; Law Professor 
Blogs, http://www.lawprofessorblogs.com (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
 17. The top blog, as measured by unique links in the last six months, was in Chinese. Instapundit 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/9
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In the blogosphere, legal scholars can comment on pending cases or 
legislation without fear that the issue will become stale before anyone gets 
a chance to read it. They have no reason to fear that they will never have 
another crack at the issue, so they feel no obligation to go on at 
excruciating length. And they can reach a large audience—at least relative 
to the number they would reach with their formal legal scholarship and 
sometimes even relative to the number they could reach in a newspaper. 
Unlike writers for a newspaper, however, they can feel free to cite David 
Hume or Karl Llewellyn or write about game theory. They might even cite 
to the Federalist Papers.  
What purpose does it serve? Some would argue next to none—that 
blogging is just one more self-indulgence by law professors. And maybe 
the naysayers are more right than I would like to concede.19 The problem 
is that blogging is fun. And since various rules, regulations, and practices 
make the job of tenured law professor one of the best protected sinecures 
in the nation, it would be unwise to take as gospel my (very tentatively 
held) contrary opinion that blogging is a useful activity for legal 
scholars.20 I may be just a bit biased. 
 
 
was number fifteen, and the Volokh Conspiracy was number one hundred as of June 29, 2006. 
Technorati, http://www.technorati.com/pop/blogs/ (last visited June 29, 2006). 
 18. Perhaps not all are using the medium to reach a general audience, so perhaps not all are 
examples of the law professor as “public intellectual.” For some law professors, the blog is an 
extension of more traditional models of the law professor. My colleague Shaun Martin, for example, is 
the author of California Appellate Blog—very much in the traditional style of legal scholarship in 
everything but its casual tone. Shaun’s blog performs a service for practicing lawyers and judges by 
alerting them to new decisions by the California Courts of Appeal. Others—like Legal Theory Blog 
written by my former colleague Larry Solum—work within a more modern conception of legal 
scholarship. It alerts law professors and other scholars who study the law and legal institutions of 
recent works of theoretical scholarship. It is unclear to me how many readers are non-scholars. 
 The more free-wheeling academic blogs that aim at a more general audience come closer to what I 
mean by public commentary on current issues and events. Included among these would be the blog I 
share with some of my USD colleagues. Our blog purports to provide the general reader with 
“thoughts from San Diego on law, politics and culture.” And that’s pretty much what we do. Very little 
is off limits. At our best, we try to furnish a law professor’s perspective on newsworthy events and 
issues. (At our worst, we are guilty of contemplating our own navels and the navels of our nearest and 
dearest.) It’s done in the extremely informal style of the blogosphere.  
 19. But the fact that many legal scholars enjoy blogging is not in itself proof of its lack of 
productive value. Many people enjoy their jobs. 
 20. To begin with, the law professor is tenured. The law school’s (or indeed anyone’s) ability to 
influence his conduct is thus very limited. Moreover, the law school cannot choose to forgo the 
practice of tenuring faculty members. The ABA Council on Legal Education, in what may be another 
example of “agency capture,” in this case by faculty members, requires tenure (and other various 
benefits) for full-time faculty. No law school can afford to go without ABA accreditation. Federal 
funding (including federally subsidized student loan programs) are contingent on ABA accreditation as 
is the right of law school graduates to sit for almost all state bar examinations. 
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Others take a view of blogging that is only slightly more generous than 
these naysayers’. They argue that blogging takes the place of faculty 
lounge chit-chat, which in the age of the internet takes place less often, 
since many law professors work from home now that the need to stick 
close to the law library is diminished. Under this view, some very useful 
things may be accomplished—ideas may be fleshed out in conversation, 
bad ideas shot down, and good ideas encouraged—but blogger chit-chat, 
like faculty lounge chit-chat, must ultimately be judged by fruit that comes 
in the shape of more and better formal legal scholarship. The fact that a 
blogger’s work may be viewed on the Internet by anyone at any time is not 
so much viewed as a virtue of the medium as it is unfathomable. Why 
would anyone other than a working scholar want to read about such half-
baked ideas? 
I am inclined instead to the view that blogging is valuable for its own 
sake. It provides a conduit by which ideas from the legal academy can be 
added to the usual public discourse. But it’s important to note that conduit 
works both ways. By allowing the real world issues into the legal 
academy, it allows scholars to connect with that world in a way they 
otherwise might not. It thus reminds them that they are not just scholars, 
but lawyers. When done well, it can make scholars public intellectuals in 
the best sense of that term. 
Few would argue that all blog entries by legal scholars (or even most of 
them) are high quality. Overwhelmingly they are not. Lots of chaff 
appears to be inherent in the medium. But that does not distinguish blogs 
from more traditional forms of writing by law professors. As Judge Posner 
has noted, in the context of legal scholarship, “[o]ut of 6000 eggs laid by a 
female salmon and fertilized by a male, on average only two salmon are 
born who live to adulthood.”21 Yet it would be silly to suggest that the 
endeavor is not worth it for the salmon. A low rate of success for law 
review articles does not necessarily mean that more formal legal 
scholarship should not be undertaken. It should not be regarded as an 
argument against legal blogging either. 
It’s true that some legal blog entries are remarkably trivial. Legal 
scholars comment on the cute things their children said at the breakfast 
table or the tummy ache they got after eating too much dim sum. Hardly 
anyone is foolish enough to regard them all as insightful legal 
commentary. But it’s important to judge them for what they are intended 
to be and not for something else. Good trial attorneys (and good teachers) 
 
 
 21. Posner, supra note 9, at 1928. 
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know that if you want to influence people, you’ve got to tell a story now 
and then. Bloggers know it too. Some of these stories really are insightful. 
But bloggers also know that they must fill a blank page now and then, so 
not every story will be infused with deep meaning; many are just efforts to 
be entertaining. The most trivial stories drive some readers crazy; indeed, 
sometimes they drive me crazy. But when done well, merely entertaining 
stories probably do keep some readers coming back (and if they don’t, 
legal bloggers will probably move away from them over time).  
Apart from such filler, is legal blogging scholarship? Well, that strikes 
me as no more useful a question than that perennial conversation stopper, 
“Yes, but is it art?” It doesn’t matter whether it gets called “scholarship” 
or “Fred.” What matters is whether it is a sufficiently worthwhile activity 
for legal scholars that law schools (and the community that supports law 
schools) ought to encourage their participation generally.  
I am inclined to feel that it is worth at least some of our time—that it 
both provides useful commentary on pressing contemporary legal issues of 
a kind that would be available nowhere else and helps to prevent hyper-
scholasticism in the legal academy. But I readily admit that the jury is still 
out over whether blogging will sustain the interest of both legal scholars 
and their readers over time.22 I hope it does. I hope that law schools give it 
 
 
 22. It is not that I have significant doubts about the value of the blogosphere as a whole. To the 
contrary, it seems to me that it has already proven its value many times over. It has the significant 
structural downside of reinforcing readers’ own political viewpoints (and hence of fostering extremism 
among those with that tendency), since every reader can always find and read blogs that he or she 
already agrees with. But it also possesses at least three significant virtues.   
 First, coming as it did after a long period of mainstream media monopoly, during which much of 
the media had become fat and lazy, the blogosphere had its work cut out for it. Call it good timing if 
you will, but the fact is that bloggers are extremely effective critics of the media. Dan Rather’s scalp is 
unlikely to be their last. 
 Its second virtue is its unique pajama brigade, which I believe is an inherent virtue of the 
technology. Most bloggers—and there are many—are dilettantes. They have day jobs that frequently 
require a substantial level of expertise. Individually they may be just a computer analyst who knows a 
lot about computer typography or some corporate lawyer who knows a lot about the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. Together their expertise outdistances the combined expertise of the mainstream media by orders 
of magnitude. A journalist friend of mine once told me that he is an inch deep and a mile wide on 
every subject and that’s what he’s paid to be. That is not the profile of the typical blogger. The best, 
like the best journalists, have broad knowledge and interests, but they also have a deep end, an area in 
which they really do know something and know it well. 
 I believe that the third virtue of the blogosphere is also inherent, but it’s a bit more difficult to 
explain why. The blogosphere appears to be specially suited to point out when the emperor has no 
clothes. I say this because I believe I’ve seen it happen more than once. 
 The Harriet Miers nomination, and the reaction to it by conservative legal bloggers, is perhaps my 
best example. Whatever one’s political persuasion, that reaction is worth examining. In the moments 
immediately after the nomination, a number of prominent conservative lawyers effusively praised the 
President’s choice. But evidently quite a few conservative lawyers had doubts about the choice—
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enough encouragement to make that possible. Most of all I hope that my 
fellow legal scholars will remember Messrs. Hamilton, Jay, and Madison 
and understand that not every insightful legal writing must be long, 
ponderous, and unreadable to the general public. 
 
 
doubts they might have been willing to keep to themselves had they not been aware that others shared 
those doubts. With the blogosphere, they were discovered quickly. 
 Part of the explanation is the sheer numbers involved. There’s usually someone in every crowd 
who is willing to speak his mind. But it’s not just that. At least two more things may be at work here. 
Bloggers get used to sharing their thoughts—even tentatively held thoughts. In a world without a 
blogosphere, those same human beings might have been asked to comment on radio or television on 
the Miers nomination and might have declined to do so, or done so and pulled their punches. The 
blogosphere emboldens this sort of person. They know they’re supposed to say something. Why not 
say what they’re really thinking? Combine that effect with the important fact that as dilettantes they 
really have less to lose if they write a blog entry that is later judged too hot-headed, and suddenly 
you’re dealing with a very frank medium. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/9
